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I. INTRODUCTION
In the past several years, four federal court decisions interpreting Title
IX1 have sent tremors through the collegiate athletic establishment.2 In all of
* Mary W. Gray is professor of mathematics and statistics at American University, Was-
hington, D.C. She has a Ph.D. from the University of Kansas and a J.D. from the Washington
College of Law, American University. She was an expert witness for the plaintiffs in the Cali-
fornia NOW, Cohen, Haffer, James, Roberts, Sanders, and Sharif cases referred to in this Article.
1. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, as amended by the Civil Rights Res-
toration Act of 1987, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). The Act provides that "[nlo person in the Unit-
ed States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving federal
financial assistance .... " 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Since Title IX was amended by the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Title IX applies to all of an institution's programs if any part
of an educational institution receives federal funds; thus an athletics program need not be the
direct recipient of federal funding in order to be subject to Title IX requirements.
Title IX specifies that its proscription of gender discrimination in athletics should not be
"interpreted to require any educational institution to grant preferential or disparate treatment
to the members of one sex on account of [a gender] imbalance" between the persons partici-
pating in the program and the total number of persons in the relevant community: 20 U.S C.
§ 1681(b). However, subsection (b) also provides that it "shall not be construed to prevent the
consideration in any . . . proceeding . . . of statistical evidence tending to show that such an
imbalance exists with respect to the participation in, or receipt of the benefits of, any such
program or activity by the members of one sex." Id.
2. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 580 (1993)1 Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7 F.3d 332
(3d Cir. 1993); Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated and remanded,
992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992) (issuing
preliminary injunction), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993) (preliminary injunction), affd on
reh'g, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
In the wake of several of these decisions, a number of cases were settled. In Sanders v.
University of Tex. at Austin, No. A-92-CA-405 (W.D. Tex. filed Nov. 10, 1992) (order approv-
ing settlement agreement of Oct. 24, 1993), the University agreed to move its participation
rate from the current 23% to 44% over a period of five years and to raise the portion of the
financial aid going to women athletes to 42%. Diane Heckman describes how in Kiechel v.
Auburn Univ., No. CV-93-V-474-E (M.D. Ala. filed Apr. 14, 1993), the plaintiffs settled for
$460,000 in damages plus $80,000 for legal fees, the formation of a soccer team for at least
five years, with a budget of $400,000 for 1993-94 and 1994-95 combined, four scholarships for
1993-94, and adequate practice and game facilities. Prior to the suit, 45% of the students and
25% of the athletes were women and only 7-11% of the university's athletics budget was
spent on women's teams. Diane Heckman, The Explosion of Title IX Legal Activity in Intercolle-
giate Athletics during 1992-1993: Defining the "Equal Opportunity" Standard, 1994 DEr. C.L. REV.
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these, cases, the courts found the universities to have failed to provide effec-
tive accommodation for the athletic interests and abilities of their women
students, as required by the regulations issued pursuant to Title IX.3 Al-
though the regulations state that such accommodation is only one of the
factors to be considered in determining compliance with Title IX, it was
because of deficiencies in this area that courts found the institutions in viola-
tion of the statute. In particular, courts asserted that the universities did not
provide participation opportunities to women and men in numbers "substan-
tially proportionate" to their respective enrollments. Unfortunately, the courts
failed to supply guidance as to the precise meaning of "substantially propor-
tionate." This Article suggests a statistical framework for such guidance.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
A. The Title IX Statute and Regulations
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 requires that institutions
not discriminate on the basis of sex in their athletics programs, including
intercollegiate athletics.4 When Congress originally enacted Title IX, it pro-
vided that the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issue regula-
tions that would assist educational institutions in complying with the stat-
ute." After the Title IX regulations were promulgated, the Office for Civil
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Education issued a Policy Interpretation
Manual to aid schools in understanding the regulations.6 The Policy Inter-
953, 990. In the case of James v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No. 94-0031-R (W.D.
Va. filed Jan. 25, 1994), which was a class action lawsuit with 18 named plaintiffs, the Uni-
versity also settled.
A trio of lawsuits was filed in state courts against various campuses of the California
State University, alleging violation of Sections 89240 and 89241 of the California Education
Code. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 89240-89241 (West 1983). The plaintiffs also alleged violations of
the equal protection clause of the California State Constitution. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 7 (West
1983 & Supp. 1996). See, e.g., California Nat'l Org. of Women v. Evans, No. 728548 (Cal. App.
Dep't Super. Ct. filed February 3, 1993). The dispute in California Nat'l Org. of Women v. Bd
of Trustees for the Cal. State Univ., No. 949207 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Oct. 20, 1993)
(conse nt decree) was settled with a consent decree for all of the system.
Under threat of suit, the University of Oklahoma, the College of William and Mary, the
University of New Hampshire, the University of California at Los Angeles, and the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst restored women's teams that had been eliminated due to budget
cuts. Jill K. Johnson, Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics: Current Judicial Interpretation of the
Standards for Compliance, 74 B.U. L. REv. 553, 584 n.195 (1994) (citing Andrew Blum, Athletics
in the, Court: New Wave of Title IX School Bias Suit Hit, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 5, 1993, at 1, 30); John
Bannon, Title IX, USA TODAY (Arlington, Va.), Aug. 23, 1993 at 9C. Cornell University settled
a lawsuit by reinstating women's teams in gymnastics and fencing. Robert M. Thomas, Jr.,
Cornell Reinstates Two Women's Sports, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1993, at B26.
But cf. Arnot v. Ramo, No. 92-0551, (D.N.M. July 19, 1992) (bench decision), appeal dis-
missed, No. 92-2151 (10th Cir. Nov. 3, 1992) (original action dismissed March 9, 1993) (uphold-
ing the University of New Mexico's elimination of its women's gymnastics team and declaring
that a program-wide, rather than sport-specific analysis was required under Title IX).
3. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
4. See supra text accompanying note 2.
5. Later, the Department of Education took over this responsibility.
6. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972; A Policy Interpretation; Title IX and
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pretation delineates three areas of inquiry7 to test an institution's compliance
with Title IX in Athletic Programs. These are
(1) Athletic Financial Assistance (Scholarships);'
(2) Equivalence in Other Athletic Benefits and Opportunities;9 and
(3) Effective Accommodation of Student Interests and Abilities. °
The OCR measures compliance in the third area of effective accommodation
by applying a three-prong test:
(1) Whether intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and
female students are provided in numbers substantially proportionate to their
respective enrollments; or
(2) Where the members of one sex have been and are underrepresented
among intercollegiate athletes, whether the institution can show a history
and continuing practice of program expansion which is demonstrably
responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members of that
sex; or
(3) Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercolle-
giate athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of pro-
gram expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated
that the interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully
and effectively accommodated by the present program."
Although compliance with the effective accommodation requirement can
be satisfied by meeting any one of the three prongs, only the first truly pro-
vides a "safe harbor" for institutions. If the representation of men and
women among the athletes is "substantially proportionate" to their represen-
Intercollegiate Athletics, 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (1979). In Cohen, the First Circuit held that the
regulations promulgated pursuant to Title IX should control. This degree of deference is ap-
propriate because Congress "explicitly delegated to the agency the task of prescribing
standards for athletic programs under Title IX." Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978
(D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), affd on reh'g, 897 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
Additionally, the Policy Interpretation, the court continued, warrants "substantial deference"
because it is a "considered interpretation" of the agency's own regulations. Cohen, 991 F.2d at
896-97.
7. The factors to consider in this inquiry, listed in 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)-(10) (1995) are
the following:
(1) Whether the selection of sports and levels of competition effectively accommodate
the interests and abilities of members of both sexes;
(2) The provision of equipment and supplies;
(3) Scheduling of games and practice time;
(4) Travel and per diem allowance;
(5) Opportunity to receive coaching and academic tutoring;
(6) Assignment and compensation .of coaches and tutors;
(7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services;
(9) Provision of housing and dining facilities and services;
(10) Publicity
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1)-(10).
8. 34 C.F.R. § 106.37(c).
9. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)-(10).
10. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(1).
11. 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418, 71,483.
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tation in the undergraduate student body as a whole, no further inquiry
need be undertaken in this area. However, interpretation of the requirements
of this prong is crucial. If "substantially proportionate" is taken to mean that
the percentage of women among an institution's athletes must be within a
few percentage points of the percentage of women in the undergraduate stu-
dent body, then nearly every institution in the country with a major athletics
program would fail this prong of the test for Title IX compliance. 2
The interpretation of "substantially proportionate" is obviously impor-
tant to the observance of the statute. Without guidance from the courts on
this definition, institutions have had no indication of how to reach this "safe
harbor" of Title IX compliance. Unfortunately, the recent court decisions
have not made clear either what constitutes equal treatment of female and
male athletes. This Article contains a proposal for an appropriate statistical
measure of substantial proportionality for universities and the NCAA to
consider in their quest to bring athletic programs into compliance with Title
IX. Other statistical issues that arise in Title IX college athletics cases will
also be discussed.
12. While a majority of students at Division I schools are women, female athletes only
receive 35% of the athletic scholarship money. Debra E. Blum, Slow Progress on Equity: Survey
of Division I College Show Little Has Changed for Female Athletes, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc. (Wash-
ington, D.C.), Oct. 26, 1994, A45. Those institutions which have football teams face particular
difficulties because squads may have as many as 145 players, and the NCAA permits 85
scholarships for football. See Johnson, supra note 2, at 586 n.203. The largest team for women
is generally lacrosse, where teams may have 28 players. 1992 FINAL REPORT OF NCAA GENDER-
EQurrY TASK FORCE (July 26, 1993) (on file with the Duke Journal of Gender Law & Policy) (rec-
ommending guidelines to promote gender-equity). The next largest number of NCAA-allowed
scholarships is 18 for men's ice hockey and 16 for women's cross country/track. See Johnson,
supra note 2, at 586 n.203. Coaches claim that a football squad must be very large because of
injuries and transfers. Id. at 587 n.206. However, teams in the National Football League make
do with rosters of less than 50 players. Id. at 587 n.206.
In Blair v. Washington State Univ., 740 P.2d 1379, 1382 (Wash. 1987), the Washington
Supreme Court held that the trial court had abused its discretion when it excluded football
from consideration in a claim brought under the state's Equal Rights Amendment. WASH.
CONST. art. 31, §§ 1-2. The claim was also brought under the Washington Law Against Dis-
crimination. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.030 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996). The Washington
Supreme Court declared that there is no exemption from the Equal Rights Amendment for
football, but the court allowed revenue earned by athletic teams to be taken into account
when comparing budgets for men's and women's athletic programs. Blair, 740 P.2d at 1383. In
the wake of Blair, Washington State University became one of the few universities in the
country clearly in compliance with the "substantially proportionate" requirement of the Title
D Effective Accomodation regulations. Mary Jordan, Only One School Meets Gender Equity Goal
Series: Twenty Years of Title IX, WASH. Posr, June 21, 1992, at D1. At the Georgia Institute of
Technology, where the student body is only 26% female, 27% of the athletes are women,
demonstrating that one way to comply is to have relatively few women in the student body.
R. Lindsay Marshall, Cohen v. Brown University: The First Circuit Breaks New Ground Regarding
Title IX's Application to Intercollegiate Athletics, 28 GA. L. REv. 837, 850 n.102 (1994).
Football is not the only problem, however. At Georgetown University, a Division I com-
petitor that at the time did not have a Division I football team, in 1993-94 52.1% of the un-
dergraduate students were women, but only 37.2% of the athletes were women; on the other
hand, 47.7% of the athletics scholarship money went to women. Fact File: Athletics Participation
and Scholarships at 257 NCAA Division I Institutions, 1990-91 and 1993-94, CHRON. HIGHER EDUc.
(Washington, D.C.), Oct. 26, 1994, at A48.
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B. Interpretation of Title IX in Case Law
1. Effective Accommodation. The first of the recent Title IX cases applied
an individualistic approach to Title IX enforcement when deciding whether
the interests and abilities of a school's female students were being effectively
accomodated. In this approach, the court viewed the treatment of a specific
group of women as compared to a similarly situated group of men to deter-
mine whether the institution was in compliance with Title IX. This approach
focused upon the quality of treatment granted to each group, and ignored
quantitative comparisons.
Colgate University funded a men's varsity ice hockey team with a bud-
get of $238,561 plus $327,616 for financial aid in 1990_91.13 The women's
hockey team had only club status and received a mere $4,600 from the Uni-
versity. Further, the women's team members had to provide $25 each in
membership dues. The women also had to pay for their own skates, skate
sharpening, the use of the university van for road trips, and additional ex-
penses. Other disparities to the disadvantage of the women existed in prac-
tice times, facilities, and coaching. The team members repeatedly requested
the University to upgrade the women's ice hockey team from club to varsity
status in order to correct these differences. For example, in 1988 the women
hockey players requested varsity status and a budget of $18,000, and were
turned down. Coincidentally, in that same year, the men's hockey-stick bud-
get was raised to $12,000.14
Women team members brought suit in federal court,"5 alleging that
Colgate's treatment of them was discriminatory and that the University was
not in compliance with Title IX. That their team did not have varsity status
meant, they claimed, that the athletic interests and abilities of Colgate
women were not being fully and effectively accommodated by the Universi-
ty.16 Colgate in response argued that they were providing such accommoda-
tion and that the team should not be granted varsity status because
1) Women's ice hockey is rarely played at the secondary level;
2) A women's championship is not sponsored by the NCAA at any intercol-
legiate level;
3) The game is only played at approximately fifteen colleges in the east;
4) There is a lack of general student interest in women's ice hockey;
5) The members of the women's ice hockey club lack sufficient ability; and
6) Hockey is expensive to fund, and would heavily impact a total intercolle-
giate program by requiring increased locker room space, a large budget, a
full-time coach, a trainer, increased training room load, increased equipment
room size, heavy laundry demand, and coach-supported financial aid. 7
Colgate also argued that rather than comparing the treatment of the two
ice hockey teams, the court should consider the school's overall athletic pro-
13. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737, 744 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated and remanded,
992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993).
14. Heckman, supra note 2, at 968.
15. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 737.
16. Id. at 741.
17. Id. at 746-50.
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gram.18 However, the overall budget for men's varsity sports was $654,909
and the women's budget was $218,970, making it unclear that such a general
examination would have been helpful to the defense. The District Court for
the Northern District of New York rejected all of Colgate's arguments and
held that it was appropriate to look only at the treatment of men and
women ice hockey players. The court reasoned that Title IX is intended to
protect not only a class of persons, but individuals, such as the Colgate
women's ice hockey players.' 9
2. Comparison with Title VII. In employment discrimination litigation
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196420, two different types of dis-
crimination are prohibited. The first, "disparate treatment," consists of treat-
ing similarly situated women and men differently on the basis of their
sex.2' The second prohibited behavior, "disparate impact" discrimination,
occurs in certain circumstances when a facially neutral policy affects people
of different genders differently. For example, a minimum height requirement
would have a disparate impact on women. If the requirement is found to be
unrelated to the duties of the job, it would violate Title VII even if the em-
ployer did not intend to discriminate by instituting the requirement.'
In contrast, organizing collegiate athletics necessarily involves a specific
gender classification. However, if an institution decides to eliminate a team
consisting solely of members of one gender, it is difficult to understand how
it could not have intended the foreseeable outcome of discrimination against
the unfavored gender. 3 Courts have consistently held, similarly to employ-
ment disparate impact cases, that a specific intent to discriminate is not re-
quired in order to establish a violation of Title IX.
24
18. Id. at 742.
19. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) states "ln]o person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded ...
be denied ... or be subjected to discrimination .... " (emphasis added). In addition, the
Title IX regulations permit consideration of "the failure to provide necessary funds for teams
for one sex in assessing equality of opportunity for members of each sex." 34 C.F.R. § 106.-
41(c).
20. 20.42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-20004a (1994).
21. Discrimination on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic origin is also prohibited. Id.
22. Relying solely on Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores for the award of scholarships
has been found to have a disparate impact on women and certain minorities. See, e.g., Sharif
v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F. Supp. 345, 361-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (granting preliminary
injunction based on disparate impact of defendant's sole reliance on SAT scores in awarding
scholarships because SAT scores are not reliable indicators of success in college).
23. See, e.g., Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1987), vacated as moot
and remanded, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[T]he 'intent' that Temple urges does not exist is
provided by Temple's explicit classification of intercollegiate athletic teams on the basis of
gender.").
24. Id. at 539-401; see also Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.
Colo.), affd in part and rev'd in part, sub nom. Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993). Title IX was modeled on Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 20, which requires discriminatory intent. See Guardians
Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 608 n.1 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). In Roberts,
the University argued that because Title IX was modeled on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act,
proof of a Title IX violation must therefore also require intentional discrimination. Roberts, 998
F.2d at 832. Rejecting this argument, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that Guardians had actually
validated disparate impact style regulations promulgated under Title VI. Id; see also Haffer, 678
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In Title VII cases, if the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of dispa-
rate treatment or disparate impact, then the burden shifts to the defendant to
justify these differences by showing that the disparate treatment was based
on factors other than sex.' In the case of disparate impact, the defendant
must show that the facially neutral policy which disparately impacts a cer-
tain class is a business necessity. The defendant must also establish that no
less restrictive policy can serve this business purpose adequately. If the de-
fendant offers a justification for the business policy, the burden shifts back
to the plaintiff to show that the employer's proffered justification for the
practice is pretextual.
In contrast, a plaintiff-athlete in a Title IX case simply argues that the
athletic interests and abilities of women are not being accommodated, and
the defendant-institution argues in response that such interests are met. To
return to the Colgate case, although the court analyzes Colgate's justifications
in a manner similar to that found in Title VII cases,26 the justifications are
much like those of other Title IX defendants. Colgate, like other institu-
tions,27 asserted that there was insufficient interest on the part of women to
justify sustaining the programs at a higher level, and that in any event, the
financial resources of the institution forced the cutbacks in the offerings for
women. In Cook, the court found that all the reasons proffered by Colgate
were pretextual, except for problem of the University's financial consider-
ations. Picking up the refrain from earlier Title VII cases, the court declared,
"[i]t is clear that financial concerns alone cannot justify gender discrimina-
tion."' Unfortunately, other institutions did not heed the lesson in Cook,
and they continued to argue unsuccessfully that it simply would be too cost-
ly to meet any of the three alternative tests for compliance with Title IX.29
F. Supp. at 539-40. The Tenth Circuit has also held that "disparate impact" is sufficient to
establish discrimination under Title IX. Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupa-
tional Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316-17 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987).
25. See, e.g., Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 249-50 (1981);
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
26. The Cook court applied the Title VII burden-shifting analysis of Burdine, 450 U.S. at
252-56, in stating:
[T]he plaintiffs, in order to establish a prima facie case, must demonstrate the fol-
lowing: (1) that the athletic department at Colgate is subject to the provisions of
Title IX; (2) that they are entitled to the protection of Title IX; and (3) that they
have not been provided "equal athletic opportunities." If plaintiffs prove a prima
facie case, they will have established a rebuttable presumption that Colgate has
violated Title IX. This presumption, however, will disappear from the case if Col-
gate comes forward with legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision not
to upgrade the women's ice hockey team to varsity status. Once Colgate has in-
troduced such evidence, in order to prevail, the plaintiffs must prove that Col-
gate's proffered reasons are merely a pretext.
Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 743-44.
27. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 988 (D.R.I. 1992) ("[A]ccording to
the defendants, any disparities which exist . . . is [sic] merely a reflection of the varying
interests and abilities of the students."), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), affd on reh'g, 879 F.
Supp. 185 (1995).
28. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 750 (quoting Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 530 (E.D.
Pa. 1987), vacated as moot and remanded, 992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993)).
29. See, e.g., Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1518 (D. Colo.) ("[T]he
primary reason the women's softball team was eliminated was to reduce the budget shortfall
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The district court in Cook ordered Colgate to grant varsity status to the
women's ice hockey program starting with the 1993-94 school year and to
provide equivalent athletic opportunities for the women ice hockey players.
However, the court declined to award damages, reasoning that the plaintiffs
were aware of the circumstances of the women's ice hockey team when they
entered Colgate. In the view of the court, "the players reaped benefits which
outweighed any losses," making the experience "worth the money."' The
court also found the evidence regarding actual damages vague and insuffi-
cient.31
The Second Circuit vacated this judgment as moot since the plaintiffs
would graduate before the order could take effect.32 But this decision is
nonetheless important because it has led subsequent plaintiffs to take pains
to frame their complaints as class actions in order to perpetuate the cause of
action beyond the graduation of the named plaintiffs.3 Even though the
Second Circuit vacated the judgment, the case is important for understand-
ing the pattern of other Title IX litigants and courts.
3. Substantial Proportionality. In contrast to the focus of the Cook court
upon the differneces in the accomodation of the individual female ice hockey
players compared to male ice hockey players at Colgate, other courts have
focused upon the disparity between the women in athletic programs and
universities as a whole when determining whether the interests and abilities
of female athletes have been effectively accomodated. This latter approach is
referred to as the substantial proportionality test, and is a quantitative rather
than qualitative determination.
In 1991, Indiana University of Pennsylvania cut two men's and two
women's varsity sports from its athletics program. This increased the already
wide disparity between the percentage of women in the student body and
the percentage of women among student athletes from 18% to 19.1%. The
female athletic participation rate was 36.51%, though women made up
55.61% of the student body after the cuts. The displaced women athletes
brought suit against the school under Title IX3 The court found that with
a difference of 19.1% between women's participation and enrollment rates,
the representation of women among the athletes could not be said to be
"substantially proportionate" to their representation in the student body, so
in CSU's athletic department."), affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado
State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Favia v. Indiana
Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 582 (W.D. Pa.) ("[Tihe thrust of the testimony ... for the
university was that the cuts were necessitated by budget problems."), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir.
1993).
30. Cook, 802 F. Supp. at 751.
31. Id.
32. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 992 F.2d 17, 20 (2d Cir. 1993).
33. See, e.g., Pederson v. Louisiana State Univ., No. CV94-247-A-MI, 1996 WL 18956, at *1
(M.D. La. Jan. 12, 1996); James v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., No 94-0031-R
(W.D. Va. filed Jan. 25, 1994).
34. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 579-80 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7 F.3d 332
(3d Cir. 1993).
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the University had failed the first prong of the effective accomodation test. s
Indiana University of Pennsylvania also failed to meet the second prong of
the regulations, which entails showing a pattern of continuing expansion of
women's programs. 3 Although the University claimed to have plans to add
women's sports in the near future, the court noted "[ylou can't replace pro-
grams with promises."Y Thus the court established that "continuing expan-
sion" would be judged by measurable results. This gives even more import to
the need for a statistical measure of how an institution can meet the "sub-
stantially proportionate" prong of the Regulations.
Additionally, at Indiana University of Pennsylvania, there were women
athletes of sufficient ability who had been on the eliminated teams, who had
competed adequately. The Favia court considered these two factors especially
significant when it determined that Indiana University of Pennsylvania had
failed to comply with the third prong of the full and effective accommoda-
tion test.
Defendants in Title IX cases have complained that the third prong of
this test would require a university to start up a new team for any woman
who expresses a desire to compete, once the university has been shown to
have failed the "substantially proportionate" prong of the test.39 However,
in the Title IX cases discussed in this Article,' all that was at issue was the
accomodation of either teams that had previously been competing effectively
and were eliminated or reduced from varsity to club status, or existing
teams in club status that the plaintiffs sought to have upgraded. The pres-
ence of the players on these teams and their desire to continue competing
35. Id. at 584-85; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (laying out this first of the three
prongs for meeting the effective accomodation test for Title IX compliance).
36. Favia, 812 F. Supp. at 585; see also 44 Fed. Reg. at 71, 418 (laying out this second of
the three prongs for meeting the effective accomodation test for Title IX compliance).
37. Id. at 585.
38. Id. at 585; see also 44 Fed. Reg. 71,418 (laying out this third of the three prongs for
meeting the effective accomodation test for Title IX compliance).
39. See, e.g., Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 208 n.47 (D.R.I. 1995). Universities
also express fear that there will be wholesale elimination of non-revenue-producing men's
sports in order to bring the athletics programs into compliance with Title IX (or that football
'will be "ruined" by being forced to operate with smaller squads). Male athletes who seek
restoration of eliminated teams have had little success in court, not having disparate partic-
ipation rates upon which to rely. See, e.g., Gonyo v. Drake Univ., 837 F. Supp. 989, 994 (S.D.
Iowa 1993) ("Title IX does not establish a right to participate in any particular sport in one's
college and there is no constitutional right to participate in intercollegiate or high school ath-
letics."). The Gonyo court held that to drop men's wrestling was not a Title IX violation
where males were 75.3% of the athletes and only 42.8% of the undergraduates. Id. at 992, 996;
see also Kelley v. Bd. of Trustees, 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 938
(1995) (holding that University's decision to terminate the men's swim team but not the wo-
men's swim team did not violate Title IX where men were 76.6% of the athletes and only
56% of the undergraduate student body).
40. Cook v. Colgate Univ., 802 F. Supp. 737 (N.D.N.Y. 1992), vacated as moot and remanded
992 F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1993); Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7
F.3d 332 (3d Cir. 1993); Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D. Colo.), affd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978 (D.R.I. 1992),
affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993), affd on reh'g, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
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was deemed sufficient to show that the third prong was not satisfied."'
These are hardly the extreme cases about which the defendants complain.
Since these cases present dedicated athletes with fairly high levels of
competency, thus far it is not clear what minimum level of interest and abil-
ities, or what assurance of effective competition, needs to be demonstrated
by a plaintiff in order for Title IX to mandate the establishment of a com-
pletely new team. The settlement in Sanders v. University of Texas at Austin'
mandated the creation of new teams when female students demonstrated
that interests and abilities were present to a large enough extent to force the
University to establish varsity teams in soccer, softball, and field hockey. The
women athletes could demonstrate this through the existence of club and
intramural teams and the growth of competition in these sports in Texas
high schools in recent years. The Office for Civil Rights Investigator's Manual
suggests that an on-campus survey be used to learn what new sports might
be added by schools seeking to comply with Title IX.'3 This technique has
been used, for example, prior to a settlement in Kiechel v. Auburn Universi-
ty;" the plaintiffs demonstrated that 1,300 women undergraduates at Au-
burn University had signed a petition expressing their interest in participat-
ing in women's varsity soccer. 45
The Favia6 court became the first federal court explicitly to adopt and
embrace the provisions of the OCR Policy Interpretation that set forth the
three prong test for determining whether the interest and abilities of women
are being effectively accomodated. It did so by granting an injunction rein-
stating the women's gymnastics and field hockey teams at Indiana University
of Pennsylvania after arguments by the plaintiffs that rested upon this inter-
pretation. The University subsequently moved to modify the injunction by
replacing women's gymnastics with women's soccer, a move that would
have increased the female participation rate, but would have decreased the
percentage of the athletics budget going to women's sports. The Third Cir-
cuit upheld the district court's refusal to modify the injunction.47
41. It is generally established that plaintiffs bear the burden of proof for the effective
accommodation prong of the test. The district courts in Cohen and Roberts improperly assigned
the burden of proof for this prong to the defendant, but the circuit courts of appeal have
found those mistakes to be harmless errors, as the records were adequate to carry what
should have been the plaintiffs' burdens. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d
824, 831 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993); Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888,
903-04 (1st Cir. 1993), affd on reh'g, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
42. Sanders v. University of Tex., No. A-92-CA-405 (W.D. Tex. filed Nov. 10, 1992) (order
approving settlement agreement on Oct. 24, 1993).
43. VALERIE M. BONNTE & LAMAR DANIE, OFFICE FOR CIVwL RIGHrs, US. DEFT. oF EDUc., Tnu
IX ATHLETcS INVESTIGATOR'S MANUAL 27 (1990).
44. Kiechel v. Auburn Univ., No. CV-93-V-474-E (M.D. Ala. filed April 14, 1993).
45. Id.
46. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d Cir.
1993).
47. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 344 (3d Cir. 1993).
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4. All Three Alternatives. In May 1991, Brown eliminated University
funding for the varsity women's gymnastics and volleyball teams, as well as
the men's golf and water polo squads.' A class action suit was brought on
behalf of all present and future Brown University women students and po-
tential students who participate, seek to participate, and/or are deterred
from participating in intercollegiate athletics funded by Brown. A prelimi-
nary injunction reinstated the women's gymnastics and women's volleyball
teams to university-funded varsity status and prohibited the elimination or
reduction in status or funding of any other existing women's varsity
teams.49
In upholding the injunction, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
stressed that an institution could not be found in violation of Title IX unless
it failed to satisfy any of the alternative tests promulgated in the OCR regu-
lations. That is, the plaintiffs first must show that the participation rates and
enrollment rates are not substantially proportionate to succeed in a Title IX
suit.' The defendants also then must fail to show that there is a pattern of
continuing expansion, and fail to show that the institution is fully and effec-
tively accommodating the interests and abilities of the women students in
order for a court to find a violation of Title IX.5
Following the First Circuit's decision, a trial was held on the merits of
the plaintiff's claim. Although the heart of the suit was Brown's alleged fail-
ure effectively to accommodate the interests and abilities of its women stu-
dents, the plaintiffs cited disparate treatment in a number of areas covered
by the Title IX regulations. 2 These treatment issues were settled by the par-
ties after the First Circuit decision leaving only the issue of effective accom-
modation for the district court to try.
In the 1993-94 seasons 61.87% of the 897 varsity athletes at Brown were
men and 38.13% were women.53 In contrast, 48.86% of the 5,772 undergrad-
uates were men and 51.14% were women." This data led the district court
to find that Brown failed to meet the "safe harbor" of substantial proportion-
ality, the first of the three prongs of the Title IX Regulations regarding the
Effective Accomodation area of inquiry."5
48. After originally calling the demoted teams "club varsities," Brown renamed them
"intercollegiate clubs" and then introduced a new classification of sports - donor-funded varsi-
ty. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp 185, 189 n.6 (D.R.I. 1995). These teams were expected
to compete at the varsity level but without any university funds and with few university
privileges. Id. at 189. The men's donor-funded teams, drawing on a base of a half century or
more of alumni participants, were able to raise more money than the women's donor-funded
teams, which operated at a much lower-funded level than either the men's donor-funded or
the university-funded teams. Id. at 189-90.
49. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 1001 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993, affd on reh'g, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
50. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 897-98 (1st Cir. 1993), aff'd on reh'g, 879 F.
Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
51. Id. at 898.
52. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 809 F. Supp. 978, 994-97 (D.R.I. 1992), affd, 991 F.2d 888 (1st
Cir. 1993), affd on reh'g, 879 F. Supp. 185 (D.R.I. 1995).
53. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. at 185, 211 (D.R.I. 1995).
54. Id. at 211.
55. Id. at 192. The court rejected a number of alternative methods for computing both the
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The district court also found that Brown did not satisfy the "continuing
expansion" prong of the Effective Accomodation test in the Regiflations.
Brown had expanded athletic programs for women rapidly in the 1970s after
the former women's college, Pembroke, was absorbed into Brown. This indi-
cated a history of program expansion, but no new teams had been added
since 1982, except for one that was added after the preliminary injunction
was issued. Thus it could not be said that Brown had a continuing practice of
expansion. The court stated:
Because merely reducing program offerings to the overrepresented sex does
not constitute program "expansion," the fact that Brown has eliminated or
demoted several men's teams does not amount to a continuing practice of
program expansion for women. In any case, Brown has not proven that the
percentage of women participating in intercollegiate athletics has increased.
Since the 1970s the percentage of women participating in Brown's varsity
athletic program has remained remarkably steady.'
Holding that reducing program offerings for men cannot satisfy the continu-
ing expansion part of the test was a step forward in Title IX jurisprudence.
However, had the number of male participants decreased sufficiently, so that
the populations were "substantially proportionate," Brown would have been
in compliance under the "safe harbor" test; that is, Brown would not have
been in violation of Title IX.57
In an attempt to show that the interests and abilities of women athletes
were being fully accommodated, Brown presented the results of a survey.
Brown had conducted the survey for the purpose of ascertaining what sports
currently not offered were of interest to students, and also summarized in-
formation as to interests of potential female students that was submitted as
part of the Brown admission applications process.' But the First Circuit
disregarded these studies and affirmed the preliminary injunction issued by
the district court. "[Prong three] requires a relatively simple assessment of
number of "participation opportunities" and the number to which that should be compared
for purposes of determining "substantially proportionate." The court chose to count all varsity
athletes, university-funded or not, as participants. Secondly, it determined that the opportuni-
ties were to be measured by actual participants, not by a hypothetical number which would
include filled and "unfilled" slots by counting the maximum size squad ever achieved or
counting as women's "opportunities" the number of participants on a men's team if it exceed-
ed the number of participants on a similar women's team. For example, there were 30 mem-
bers of the men's baseball team compared to 15 on the women's softball team; Brown wanted
to count 30 "participation opportunities" for women, even though there was considerable
testimony that baseball teams use more players than do softball teams.
Finally, borrowing from Title VII jurisprudence, Brown unsuccessfully contended that
rather than comparing the participation rate to enrollment figures, the proper comparison
figure was the percentage of women among Brown students or applicants or potential appli-
cants interested in participating in athletics. The court found that determining an appropriate
pool would be a logistical nightmare; further, the court stated that these interests were taken
into account by allowing universities who fail to meet the first prong of the test to escape
sanction by complying with one of the other two.
56. Id. at 211 (citations omitted).
57. Id. at 202.
58. Id. at 206.
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whether there is unmet need in the underrepresented gender that rises to a
level sufficient to warrant a new team or the upgrading of an existing
team" 9 and the level of competition of the club teams was adequate evi-
dence of Brown's failure to accommodate fully the needs of its female stu-
dents.' The district court reiterated this finding in its decision on the mer-
its.
61
Brown also offered the district court the theory that the full and effec-
tive accommodation test was not violated because men also had unmet
needs and that women were being accommodated to the same extent as
men.62 The court rejected this argument, stating, "[w]e conclude that [the
Department of Education's] Policy Interpretation means exactly what it says.
This plain meaning is a proper, permissible rendition of the statute."'
Thus, the court refused to create a new defense for schools. The unmet
needs of male athletes did not excuse the unmet needs of the female athlet-
es. The court also rejected Brown's assertion that the full and effective ac-
commodation test violates the Fifth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause."
The court summarized the burden-of-proof framework for Title IX by
stating that, "a Title IX plaintiff makes out an athletic discrimination case by
proving numerical disparity, coupled with unmet interest, each by a fair
preponderance of the credible evidence, so long as the defendant does not
rebut the plaintiff's showing by adducing preponderant history-and-practice
evidence."' The court thus highlighted the importance of the substantial
proportionality test, making it clear that the plaintiff must show that this test
is not met in order to proceed with a claim. However, the court did not
indicate what level of statistical disparity (between the female athletic partici-
pation rate and female undergraduate enrollment) a Title IX plaintiff initially
must show to prove a violation.66
III. THE USE OF STATISTICS IN TITLE IX LITIGATION
A. Statistical Significance
In Roberts v. Colorado State University,67 the plaintiff-members of the
terminated women's varsity softball team argued that "substantially propor-
tionate" means a difference in percentages that is statistically significant.'
While the court did not rely on this definition, it did refer to it as a mea-
59. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 991 F.2d 888, 900 (1st Cir. 1993), affd on reh'g, 879 F. Supp.
185 (D.R.I. 1995). Brown used much the same argument regarding interest levels that had
been rejected in consideration of prong one. See discussion supra, note 55 and accompanying
text.
60. Id. at 904.
61. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 212 (D.R.I. 1995).
62. Id. at 208-09.
63. Cohen, 991 F.2d at 900.
64. Id; see U.S. CONsT., amend. V, cl. 2.
65. Id. at 902.
66. Id.
67. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507 (D.Colo.), affd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 580 (1993).
68. Id. at 1513.
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sure of substantial proportionality.69 Although the plaintiffs failed to secure
a preliminary injunction to stop the termination of their team, both parties
stipulated to a stay of the sale of the equipment, continuation of the players'
scholarships for the upcoming year, and expedited discovery.7'
The University argued that in order to find a violation of Title IX, each
part of the athletic program had to be found wanting; for example, plaintiffs
would have to show that not only were there not enough opportunities for
women to participate, but that female participants were treated less well
than their male counterparts in areas such as financial aid, scheduling, and
in the use of facilities. The court rejected this attempt by the defendant to
increase the plaintiff's burden. Instead, the court held that a violation of Title
IX may be shown by proof of a substantial violation in any one of the three
major areas of investigation set out in the Policy Interpretation, so that a
failure to satisfy the three-prong test of substantial proportionality, continu-
ing expansion, and full and effective accommodation would suffice." The
court noted that the plaintiffs bear the burden of proving that participation
rates among women and men are not substantially proportionate to the un-
dergraduate enrollments.' The defendants then bear the burden of proof
for the second and third prongs of the three-part test.73
Beginning with 1980-81 and ending in 1992-93, the gaps between
women's athletic participation rates and their undergraduate enrollment at
Colorado State University varied from a 7.5% difference in 1980-81 to 18.6%
in 1984-85 and back to 10.6% in 1993.' 4 The University argued that a dif-
ference of only 10.6% constituted substantial proportionality, pointing out
that virtually every other institution in the country had even worse dispari-
ties.'h The court rejected this argument and found that over the past de-
cade, female participation rates at CSU were not substantially proportionate
to the enrollment figures, regardless of comparison to other schools.76 Al-
though the Roberts court set no maximum allowable difference, it stated that,
"a disparity between female athletic participation and female undergraduate
enrollment of 10.6% is not acceptable under Title IX absent a showing by
defendants under the second or third prong of the Effective Accomodation
Test."' Roberts and other cases do not state what level of disparity in par-
ticipation is acceptable under Title IX.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1509-10.
71. Id. at 1511.
72. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1511 (D.Colo.), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1512.
75. Id. at 1513.
76. The court held that the participation rates at other institutions were of no legal conse-
quence. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D.Colo.), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
77. Id.
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CSU had added eleven varsity sports for women during the 1970s, but
by 1992-93, it had only eight women's varsity teams.78 Further, the partici-
pation opportunities had dropped from 183 to 120.'9 But the University
nonetheless contended that the 1970s expansion and the fact that the 55-
participant men's baseball team was cut at the same time as the 18-partici-
pant women's softball team showed a history and continuing practice of pro-
gram expansion.8° However, the court noted that over the entire period, the
number of male athletes decreased by 20%, whereas the number of female
athletes decreased by 34%.81
Further, in 1983 the OCR had conducted a Title IX compliance review
and had found CSU in violation.82 The University had agreed to a correc-
tive plan at that time, which required CSU to increase the participation rate
of women to 46.5% by 1987-88. But by that time, the participation rate had
only reached 33.8%.' CSU had further damaged its credibility by submit-
ting a progress report in 1985, claiming a participation rate of 42.9% for that
year when the rate was actually 30.7%, and the University also had failed to
add the women's teams that it had promised to establish.' In light of these
failures, the court found "that none of the major goals articulated in defend-
ants' 1983 corrective action were ever attained [and] ... that over the last
twelve years women have shouldered a disproportionate amount of the
program contraction efforts at CSU."' The court concluded that CSU had
not demonstrated a history and continuing practice of program expansion for
women. 6 Therefore, CSU failed to meet the second prong of the Effective
Accomodation test of the OCR Regulations.
Finally, the testimony of the plaintiffs and other players, bolstered by
evidence of softball's growing popularity nationwide and in Colorado high
schools, and indications that other sports for which there were no varsity
teams also enjoyed wide support among women, convinced the court that
the interests and abilities of women were not being fully and effectively
accommodated by the University.87 Thus they held that none of the three
alternatives had been satisfied and that Colorado State University was in
violation of Title IX.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the district court had
misallocated the burden of proof for prong three of the test to the defendant
rather than the plaintiffs.' However, holding that there was adequate evi-
78. Id. at 1514.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1515 (D.Colo.), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1516.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1517-18.
88. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114
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dence in the record to sustain the plaintiffs' burden to show that the interest
and abilities of women athletes at CSU were not being fully and effectively
accommodated, the appellate court affirmed the district court ruling.a9
The Roberts case presented one of the best opportunities for a court to
adopt a statistical measure of substantial proportionality, since the plaintiffs
directly raised the issue of statistical significance in the measurement of the
population disparities. But the court deferred the issue. The next section
will discuss the appropriateness of such a statistical measure.
B. Measuring Substantial Proportionality
1. The Use of Statistical Measures in Title IX Cases. The Cohen, Roberts,
and Favia courts held that 13.01%, 9' 10.6%9' and 19.1%,9 respectively, the
differences between the female athletic participation rate and the female
undergraduate population, were sufficiently large to prevent a finding of
substantially proportionate representation; however, none of the courts made
it clear how large a difference would be allowable for a university to com-
ply with Title IX. In Roberts, the district court suggested that if Colorado
State University were to keep its eighteen-member women's varsity softball
team, add a twenty-three-member women's varsity soccer team, and add a
fifteen-member women's varsity alpine ski team, then the difference would
be reduced to an acceptable 1.7%."'
S. Ct. 580 (1993).
89. Id. at 831.
90. Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 211 (D.R.I. 1995) (finding that while 51.14%
of the undergraduates were female, only 38.13% of student-athletes were female).
91. Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D. Colo.), affd in part and
rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
92. Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 812 F. Supp. 578, 585 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 7 F.3d 332 (3d
Cir. 1993) (finding that 55.61% of the undergraduate population was female whereas only
36.51% of the student-athlete population was female).
93. 814 F. Supp. at 1518. The Investigator's Manual issued by the OCR in 1990 is remark-
ably unhelpful:
If the results are substantially proportionate (for example, if the enrollment is 52%
male and 48% female, then, ideally, about 52% of the participants in the athletics
program should be male and 48% female), the recipient is effectively accommodat-
ing the interests and abilities of both sexes.
BONNEuTE & DANIEL, supra note 43, at 24 (1990).
The district court in Cohen said that "substantially proportionate" must be a standard
stringent enough to effectuate the purposes of the statute:
[S]ubstantially proportionate accounts for the possibility of minor fluctuations in
the undergraduate population and in the athletic program on one year to the
next. Thus, substantial proportionality is properly found only where the insti-
tution's intercollegiate athletic program mirrors the student enrollment as closely
as possible. This definition takes into account any small variations that are beyond
the institution's ability to control or predict.
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 202 (D.R.I. 1995).
The settlement in Sanders v. University of Texas at Austin called for the participation rate
to be brought up to 44%, which was within 3% of the enrollment rate at the time of the
settlement. It also provided that the share of athletics scholarship money going to women
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2. The Use of Statistical Measures to Determine Discrimination in Jury Selec-
tion. In other contexts, courts also have had to decide how large a deviation
must be in order to indicate that something may be amiss" and have used
a straightforward application of a binomial model to make this determina-
tion. That is, a model where each person is either in a given group or not in
that group. Although it took many years, the courts have come to recognize
the role probability plays in assessing the probative value of statistical evi-
dence. The original cases dealt with discrimination in the selection of a jury.
In a typical situation, an African-American was indicted by a grand jury and
convicted by a petit jury from which blacks were excluded to varying de-
grees. The defendant sought the intervention of the federal courts to over-
turn the resulting state court conviction on the grounds that the state
abridged the defendant's right to a trial by a jury of one's peers based upon
this exculsion.95 Later variations involved discrimination against Mexican-
American' or women jurors.97
Originally, state laws excluded African-Americans directly or indirectly,
or local officials deliberately excluded them from jury service.98 When faced
with the issue of whether this violated a defendant's constitutional rights,
the Supreme Court took the view that courts should examine the difference
between the percentage of African-Americans on the grand jury or petit jury
panel and their percentage in the local population or on tax or voter lists in
making that determination. For example, in Swain v. Alabama," African-Am-
ericans constituted 26% of the adult population of Talladega County, but
only about 10-15% of the grand and petit jury venires." But without
proof of discriminatory intent, the Court held that a 10% difference in popu-
lations did not establish proof of discrimination.'
On the other hand, in Avery v. Georgia, the defendant was convicted by
a jury selected from a panel of sixty, which was chosen from a box con-
taining tickets with the names of persons on the jury roll."2 Although the
selection from the box was supposedly at random, no African-Americans,
who made up 5% of the names in the box, were selected.0 3 Thus, although
the reduction was only from 5% to 0%, the end result was that there were
no African-Americans on the panel. In the successful challenge to the convic-
should be within 2% of the participation rate.
94. For example, courts must decide what difference between the percentage of Chicanos
in a jury pool and the percentage of Chicanos in the eligible population is substantial enough
to indicate discrimination in jury selection. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
95. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
96. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
97. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
98. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
99. 380 U.S. 202, 205 (1965).
100. No African-American had ever actually served on a petit jury, and in fact the prose-
cution had struck the six African-Americans on the panel for Swain's trial. Swain, 380 U.S. at
222-23.
101. Id. at 208-09.
102. 345 U.S. 559, 560-61 (1953).
103. It also happened that the names of whites were printed on white paper and the
names of African-Americans on yellow paper. Id., 345 U.S. at 560.
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tion, Justice Frankfurter said, "The mind of justice, not merely its eyes,
would have to be blind to attribute such an occurrence to mere fortuity."104
In Whitus v. Georgia,05 jury panels were chosen from tax rolls on
which 27.1% of those listed were African-Americans, each of whom had a
special designation "(c)" attached to her or his name. The chosen grand jury
was 9.1% African-American; only 7.8% of the petit jury was African-Ameri-
can."6 The Court took judicial notice that the likelihood of such an out-
come by random selection was six in one million, but specifically said that
its decision did not depend on the probability analysis." 7
Finally, in Castaneda v. Partida, the Court acknowledged its reliance on
probability in making a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose.0 8 In
Texas, "key men" in the community were responsible for selecting the jurors.
Even though most of the "key men" were themselves Mexican-American, in
a county 79.1% Mexican-American, the average jury venire was only 39%
Mexican-American over a period of 11 years."° The probability of this re-
sult would be 1 in 10" ° if the selection were random. ° On this basis, the
Court overturned the trial court's conviction.
Thus, over a period of 25 years, the Court moved from a discussion of
mere percentage differences, which were not necessarily indicative of the
likelihood of discrimination, to a discussion of statistically significant differ-
ences. The latter is a more telling measure. The composition of the juries
reported in Swain had one chance in 100 million of occurring if the selection
were random, whereas the chance of the result in Avery is nearly one in 20.
But Swain failed to sustain his claim of discrimination whereas Avery pre-
vailed. Had the Court applied a probability analysis to the Swain and Avery
cases, the results might have been reversed.
Soon after Castaneda, the Supreme Court continued its movement to-
wards the use of statistical measures when it decided Hazelwood School Dis-
trict v. United States."' The Hazelwood School District was accused of dis-
criminating against African-American teaching candidates.' The Court
computed the expected number of African-American teachers to be em-
ployed, based on qualified candidates in the area, compared that with the
observed number,"3 and noted a variation by five or six standard devia-
tions."4 The Court then quoted from Castaneda, stating that, "'if the differ-
104. Id. at 564 (Frankfurter, J. concurring.)
105. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
106. Id. at 552.
107, Id. at 552 n.2.
108. 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).
109. Id. at 495.
110. Id. at 496-97 n.17.
111. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
112. Id. at 303.
113. The observed number here refers to the number of African-American teachers working
in the Hazelwood School District.
114. Id. at 309. Standard deviation refers to the square root of the sum of the squares of
the difference between observations and the mean divided by one less than the number of
observations in the sample. It measures the dispersion of sample observations about the mean.
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ence between the expected value and the observed number is greater than
two or three standard deviations,' then the hypothesis that teachers were
hired without regard to race would be suspect.""' If the number of
standard deviations is more than the agreed-upon threshold (or alternatively,
the probability is less than the agreed-upon probability value), then the re-
sult is said to be statistically significant at the agreed upon level, for example
at the 5% level."6
Unfortunately, there is a huge difference between two and three
standard deviations. The probability that the difference will be as large or
larger in absolute value than two standard deviations in a sample of size at
least 30 is approximately 0.05, whereas the probability associated with three
standard deviations is approximately 0.003. This imprecision has caused all
sorts of difficulties for lower courts, but has never been clarified by the
Supreme Court."'
This test of "two or three standard deviations" has been applied to Title
VII cases, and defines "gross statistical disparity.""' Courts have used the
115. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309, 310 n.14 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496-
-97 n.17 (1977)).
116. Probability analyses are widely used in legal contexts, for example, in evaluating
DNA evidence, in antitrust market studies, in assessing whether scientific fraud has been
committed, and in computing damages in wrongful death cases. See generally I-Il JOSEPH L.
GAsTwIRTH, STATISTICAL REASONING IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY passim (1988).
117. It has been pointed out by some statisticians that the degree of imbalance required to
make out a prima facie Title VII violation, a probability of 1 in 20 or even 3 in 1000, is
exceedingly exacting, perhaps better suited to a criminal or quasi-criminal standard of proof
than the simple preponderance of the evidence test of civil cases. See, e.g., John M. Dawson,
Are Statisticians Being Fair to Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs? 21 JURIMETMcS J. 1 (1980).
To compute the number of standard deviations in a binomial model such as this one,
we form the statistic
P-Po
/PO (1 - P)
N/ n
where pO is the percentage of African-Americans in the population, p is the percentage in the
relevant group and n is the size of the relevant group. The statistic Z has an approximately
normal (bell curve) distribution when n is at least 30 so that the probability can be read from
a normal probability table (or computed using standard software). The larger the number of
standard deviations, the smaller the probability of an event occurring randomly. See, e.g.,
DAVID R. ANDERSON, DENNIS J. SWEENEY, & THOMAS A. WILLIAMS, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND
ECONOMICS 199 (5th ed. 1993).
In issuing Title VII guidelines, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission devel-
oped the "4/5 rule." That is, a selection rate for the disfavored groups that is less than 4/5
of the selection rate for the favored group will be considered evidence of discrimination. For
example, if 400 of 1000 men pass an exam but only 300 of 1000 women, the selection rate for
men is 0.4 and that for women is 0.3. Then .3/.4 = 3/4 < 4/5, so the exam process would
be suspect. This has the disadvantage - or advantage, depending upon one's point of view
- of not taking into account the size of the samples. If 3 of 10 women and 4 of 10 men
pass an exam, the ratio of the selection rates is surely less probative than in the previous
case, but the same conclusion would result under the "4/5 rule." However, the first result
would be highly statistically significant, but the second would not.
118. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 309.
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term "manifest imbalance" to describe what must be shown to justify affir-
mative action in the workplace," 9 but the courts have not clarified the is-
sue of -whether the test of two or three standard deviations is appropriate to
establish such a "manifest imbalance" warranting affirmative action. Howev-
er, in Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 2' the Supreme Court indicated that
"manifest imbalance" might be something less than what would support a
prima facie case of discrimination against the employer.121
3. The Use of Statistical Measures in Title IX Cases. A showing of "gross
statistical disparity" can establish a prima facie Title VII violation. A dem-
onstration of "manifest imbalance" is a prerequisite for affirmative action.
The courts have not explicitly stated which is more stringent; the rela-
tionship among these various tests is unclear. But applying this rationale to
Title IX, the Regulations of which state that a showing that the number of
women in an athletic program is "not substantially proportionate" to the
women in the general university population can establish violation of the
statute. It appears that a "gross statistical disparity" or a "manifest balance"
in the percentages of women athletes and women undergraduates would
establish such a violation.
It has been suggested that an analysis similar to Title VII jurisprudence
should be employed to determine whether an institution has met the
"substantially proportional" test in Title IX cases."2 Indeed, such an argu-
ment was made, and evidence was introduced to prove this in Roberts."
119. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 617 (1987).
120. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
121. Id. at 632; see also David D. Meyer, Note, Finding a "Manifest Imbalance": The Case for a
Unified Statistical Test for Voluntary Affirmative Action Under Title VII, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1986,
1999 (1989).
122. See Walter B. Connolly, Jr. & Jeffrey D. Adelman, A University's Defense to a Title IX
Gender Equity in Athletics Lawsuit: Congress Never Intended Gender Equity Based on Student Body
Ratios, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 845, 894 (1994). Connolly was counsel for Brown University;
in that case using a probability analysis showed the difference between the participation rate
and the enrollment rate of women to be statistically significant. Thus, under the probability
analysis Brown would have been found to be in violation of the substantial proportionality
requirement, as they were anyway. Plaintiffs presented such evidence, but the court relied
upon the actual percentage difference, 13.01%, in finding that Brown failed the "substantially
proportionate" test. This percentage difference between female athletes and female students
enrolled is more than six standard deviations in magnitude and the probability of such a
result occurring by chance is less than one in a million. It should be noted that Brown pro-
posed using some figure other than the percentage of women in the student body as the
figure to which the participation rate should be compared; they also wanted to compute the
participation rate differently.
123. The author of this Article served as an expert witness during the Roberts trial. The
court noted her contributions to the case in stating:
Dr. Gray testified credibly and persuasively that the difference between the pro-
portion of wonrten as undergraduates and their participation rate in athletics at
CSU is highly statistically significant, and represents a persistent pattern over the
last ten years. The Court agrees with Dr. Gray's conclusion that the disparities be-
tween women's enrollment and athletic participation rates at CSU over the last
decade could not have occurred merely by chance.
Roberts v. Colorado State Univ., 814 F. Supp. 1507, 1513 (D. Colo.), affd in part and rev'd in
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Although the court there referred to the probability analysis that had been
presented, it appeared to base its decision instead on the actual 10.5% differ-
ence between the participation rate and the enrollment rate of women.24
Applying a probability analysis showed that the two rates differed by more
than four standard deviations in each of the years from 1982-83 through
1991-92, with corresponding probabilities of less than 0.001%, or less than 1
in 100,000.
The problem with employing a probability analysis in Title IX cases,
attractive though it may be, is that the selection of athletes is not a random
process. The number of slots to be filled by each sex is essentially predeter-
mined each year by the coaches."2 Obviously, there is a certain amount of
fluctuation due to last minute transfers and the like, which would also be
present in the general student enrollment. That is why no court has held,
nor have plaintiffs contended, that the two rates must be exactly equal.
Thus, even though the process is not random, there is some chance fluctua-
tion so that using a probability analysis to measure whether the difference is
significant seems appropriate. However, if the number of athletes is very
large, even a small difference can be statistically significant. Thus it might be
wise to combine a test of statistical significance with an actual number to
denote a minimum difference considered to be of practical significance, per-
haps 2% in light of the court's dictum in Roberts.'26 In any event, even
though other facets of Title VII analysis may be inapposite for Title IX cases,
borrowing the concept of statistical significance to interpret what is "sub-
stantially proportionate" could provide useful guidance for future Title IX
litigants, defendants, and courts.
part sub nom. Roberts v. Colorado State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. de-
nied, 114 S. Ct. 580 (1993).
124. Id. The Tenth Circuit read the decree below as relying in part on the statistical signif-
icance of the disparities. Roberts at 830.
125. It is interesting to note that athletics has been by far the most active area of Title IX
litigation. Although many engineering programs still have single-digit representation of
women, no one has claimed that this is evidence of a Title IX violation. That there are no
unmet needs for engineering studies for women may well be- true, but as in the case of ath-
letics, the perceived lack of interest may simply be due to lack of efforts to encourage
women. See Cohen v. Brown Univ., 879 F. Supp. 185, 207 (D.R.I. 1995). What has made ath-
letics virtually unique is the segregation by sex. The issues in the single sex admission cases,
United States v. Virginia, 44 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S. Ct. 281 (1995) and
Faulkner v. Jones, 51 F.3d 440 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed as moot, 116 S. Ct. 331, and cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 352 (1995), concern constitutional issues, not Title IX. There is an increasing trend
to institute girls-only mathematics and science classes in coeducational schools or boys-only
"academies" within inner city schools. Some such initiatives have been halted by Title IX
considerations. Jane Gross, To Help Girls Keep Up: Math Class Without Boys, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
24, 1993, at Al.
126. 814 F. Supp. at 1518 (D. Colo. 1993). Although the regulations and policy interpreta-
tion are silent on prescribing a fixed participation ratio, some athletic conferences have insti-
tuted their own regulations. For example, Big Ten schools must have women constituting 40%
of their athletic participants by 1997. Catherine Pieronek, A Clash of Titans: College Football v.
Title IX, 20 J.C. & U.L. 351, 369 (1994). The Southeastem Conference requires that two more
women's than men's teams be supported. Id. at 370. The NCAA has developed a self-policing
certification process that looks at gender equity in the treatment of athletes, but does not
require substantial proportionality between participation and enrollment rates. Id. at 367.
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C. Other Statistical Issues
Although the Investigator's Manual is silent on the subject of the use of
probability to measure "substantially proportionate" participation, it does in-
troduce statistical tests to identify disparate impact in the distribution of
financial aid. Unfortunately, they are not properly formulated."' Although
not employed in the cases on which this Article has thus far focused, a
properly formulated statistical test can and should be used to judge whether
athletic financial assistance is being distributed in a nondiscriminatory fash-
127. First the manual describes the difference in proportions test. BONNETrE & DANIEL, supra
note 43, at 153. Z refers to the number of standard deviations. Id. Let pl denote the propor-
tion of successes in sample 1 (where success might be a head turns up when a coin is
tossed, a person is hired, etc.), p2 the proportion of successes in sample 2, and nl and n2
the size of the respective samples. Then we form the statistic:
PI_ P2
Sp(1 -pI) P2(1 -p2 )
n n2
For sufficiently large nl and n2, this statistic has an approximately normal distribution
and measures the number of standard deviations by which the two proportions differ.
This statistic would be used, for example, in a case where 20 of 100 men and 23 of 100
women were selected for some job, and we want to know whether the difference is statistical-
ly significant. However, the manual uses it to measure the difference between the percentage
of athletes who are women and the percentage of athletic financial aid going to these women.
The second sample size is taken to be the number of dollars of financial aid. Clearly this
makes little sense. Dollars are a purely arbitrary unit - quite different values for Z will
result if cents are used, or units of $100 or units of scholarships, where the value of the
scholarships is, for example, $10,000 each. It is people and dollars, not apples and oranges,
which are being compared, but it might as well be the latter as the result is equally inappro-
priate.
The second test propounded by the manual is used more or less correctly, although not
formulated exactly correctly. The test statistic t is formed by
x2 - x
22
t , Y" -/1 - .)z + Z ('f- ,)2
nI n
where X1 is the average scholarship amount for men, X2 is the average scholarship amount
for women, nl is the number of men athletes, n2 is the number of women athletes, Xli is the
amount of scholarship awarded to each man i = 1 .... nl), and X2i is the amount of schol-
arship awarded to each woman (i = 1 .... n2). (The manual incorrectly uses ni and n2
instead of n1-1 and n2-1 in the denominator.) The statistic t measures the number of stan-
dard deviations by which the average amounts of scholarships for men and women differ.
BONNE & DANIEL, supra note 43 at 156.
The manual implies that Z tests are used for proportions and t tests are used for
means (averages). Id. at 153. In fact, for sufficiently large nl and n2, both have a Z (normal)
distribution. The t test is used for means when the sample size is small. Id. at 153. Thus the
first test should be scrapped and the second, properly denoted, used to measure whether the
average scholarships for men and women differ significantly.
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ion. It is tempting to try to analyze the rest of the athletics budget by com-
paring average expenditures per man and per woman. The problem, how-
ever, is that, unlike the case with scholarships, there is no way of attributing
expenditures to individual athletes other than by taking an average. This
would, however, result in a standard error (the denominator in the expres-
sion for t) of zero, and, of course, division by zero is not possible. 121
Another approach would be to consider the expenditures by sport and
compare the average expenditure per sport, or average expenditure per sport
per athlete, for men and for women. This is not very satisfactory because
there are many legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons why some sports are
more expensive than others. Thus simply looking at the budgets for men
and women and making some qualitative comparison seems to be the best
approach for evaluating equivalence in other athletic benefits and opportuni-
ties.
Unlike the four cases detailed above, ip which minimal references are
made to funding inequalities, Haffer v. Temple University, a suit which the
plaintiffs had brought under both Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,'29 focused heavily on each of three areas in
a more quantitative analysis:
(a) the extent to which Temple affords women students fewer "opportunities
to compete" in intercollegiate athletics;'"
(b) the alleged disparity in resources allocated to the men's and women's
intercollegiate athletic programs;' and
(c) the alleged disparity in the allocation of financial aid to male and female
student athletes. 32
In its motion for summary judgment, Temple made the interesting argu-
ment that in spite of large differences in expenditures on coaching, equip-
ment, and facilities favoring men, the women's teams had a higher winning
percentage so that women were not adversely affected by any spending dis-
parities." Temple also argued that its spending policies did not hurt fe-
male athletes because their cumulative grade point averages were higher
than those of the male athletes. In response, the court stated that, "the fact
that women student athletes have a higher mean cumulative grade point
average has no relevance to the issue of whether unequal expenditures vio-
late the equal protection clause. " "34 It was only because the plaintiffs did
not submit evidence of inferior tutoring services that the court granted sum-
128. 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c)(2)-(10).
129. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
130. Haffer v. Temple Univ., 678 F. Supp. 517, 521. See the approach used supra note 128
and accompanying text.
131. Id. Here a simple comparison of average per capita expenditures seems most appro-
priate. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
132. Id. Once again, asking whether the difference between the average award for males
and the average award for females is statistically significant is a good measure of the proba-
bility that there is discrimination.
133. Id. at 528.
134. Id.
188 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY
mary judgment to Temple on this claim." But the court denied Temple's
motion for summary judgment on other claims, such as inferior participation
opportunities."'
IV. CONCLUSION
Universities need further guidance from the courts or an appropriate
regulatory body in order for them to understand what is necessary to com-
ply with Title IX in the important area of effective accommodation. Universi-
ties cannot be expected each year to match exactly the percentage of women
among athletes with the percentage of women in the undergraduate student
body to reach the safe harbor of "substantially proportionate" participation.
Yet, to assure equality of opportunity, schools must be held to a strict
standard, allowing only for unpredictable fluctuation which plagues both
athletic program enrollment and general student enrollment. Accounting for
these normal variations is exactly the reason why employing a probability
analysis in determining whether female participants and enrollment numbers
are "substantially proportionate" would be useful. In each of the cases dis-
cussed, the outcome would have been the same, but potential plaintiffs
would know that only demonstrating a statistically significant disparity
would be enough to establish a violation of the requirement of substantially
proportionate participation of male and female athletes and institutions
would have a measure that would help them achieve the "substantially pro-
portionate" participation goal to stave off such Title IX suits. The demonstra-
tion of a statistically significant disparity would establish a violation of Title
IX if the other two prongs of the test, continuing expansion and effective
accommodation, could not be shown by the defendant-institution. Adopting
such an easily computable test would move the opportunities for women
athletes further in the right direction.
135. Id. at 533.
136. Id. at 527.
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